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Nine years ago Saul P. Steinberg, then fresh from college, had a new idea in computer leasing. He parlayed
that idea into Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corporation, a dynamic international organization whose
merger plans are grabbing headlines in the major business press.
Here Bernard L. Schwartz, Chairman of Leasco's Executive Committee and Mr. Steinberg's confidant, discusses Leasco's fantastic growth and the philosophy
behind its recent mergers with Touche Ross partner
Philip H. Cohen. Mr. Cohen and Mr. Schwartz have been
working with Leasco since it was small enough to be run
from Mr. Steinberg's kitchen table.

Philip H. Cohen

COHEN:

SCHWARTZ:

Leasco began in 1961 with an initial capitalization of
about $25,000 in cash. Today it is a company with assets
of more than one billion dollars, stockholders' equity of
more than $250 million, and has grown from a small income to approximately $44 million in the current year—
after including capital gains from the insurance operation. How do you account for this phenomenal growth?

There are several things. First of all, we have the easy,
almost cliche answer—hard work. Second, we had a
concept as to where our company should be going. Although starting out in the computer leasing business, we
are proceeding in the concept of a broad-based computer and financial services, problem-solving organization. It is with this concept in mind that we geared our
external growth at Leasco.

Bernard L.

Schwartz

COHEN:
But this growth was not all through computer leasing.
You've been on a campaign to acquire companies. How
do you relate that to your overall concept?
SCHWARTZ:
Of course, much of our growth did come through acquisitions and mergers, and it is important to note that
in every case our acquisitions were happy ones in that
we achieved some synergistic value. In other words, the
companies did well, or they fit into a particular pattern;
they filled a void of business activity that we felt we
should be involved in.
In addition, it is important to emphasize that Leasco's
attitude toward acquisitions is a result of a "make or
buy" decision. This decision is based upon intensive
study of the industry, the competition, the potential
candidates for acquisition in this industry, and all other
pertinent information applicable to that particular transaction. We have a Corporate Development Department
under our vice president of corporate planning, Mike
Gibbs, which is constantly reviewing all our business
functions and activities and identifying those business
areas which are desirable and profitable extensions for
our efforts. After it identifies an industry, it analyzes the
entire group and the competitive standing of each of the
major companies in that industry.
Having made a decision to expand in a particular direction, we then measure the feasibility of developing
internally or acquiring. Some of the considerations that
enter into that measurement are Leasco's financial resources, human resources, the time factor in developing-as against acquiring, the management depth and
strength of available companies, and the availability of
industry talent—and generally, the cost (including time)
of each approach. Generally, we prefer to develop ourselves, but we will acquire when the "make or buy" decision indicates that "buy" is more desirable.
COHEN:
It seems to me you did not make any significant "buy"
decisions until Documentation, Inc. in 1967. What attracted you to a software company—and why Documentation, Inc.?
SCHWARTZ:
Documentation, Inc. is more accurately described as
an information technology company, rather than a software company. It had developed computer-based tech-

niques of information storage, retrieval and dissemination of data in printed form, microfiche and microfilm.
As you pointed out, it was a departure from computer
leasing, but it certainly fit in with our overall concept of
developing a computer services organization.
We viewed the disciplines they had developed over
many years to be an important base for the development
of a total information capability, including computer
timesharing. Documentation, Inc. was a mature company, profitable, had a high degree of professionalism,
and enjoyed an excellent reputation in the field in which
it had become a factor. Its attractions to us were obvious.
COHEN:
How about Reliance (Insurance Co.)? Why did Leasco,
which was then a growing company but not a giant,
decide that an insurance company was a company to
acquire, when that industry is known for being static and
conservative rather than growth-oriented?
SCHWARTZ:
First of all, we did not see anything inconsistent in
combining an insurance company with a financial services and computer services business. Reliance Insurance Company was a particularly attractive company
in the property and casualty field. Long before we considered Reliance in particular, we made a complete
study of the property and casualty field. We were struck
by the fact that this was an industry that lost money in
its main operation, that is, its insurance operation, but
made money in its investments.
The industry had created redundant capital (surplus
monies that were not utilized in the functioning of its
business), and many of the insurance companies were
looking then to create insurance holding companies so
these surplus funds could be used for better returns in
areas outside the property and casualty industry. Many
of them had expressed an interest in getting into the
fields we had already identified as of interest to us. So it
seemed a natural fit for Leasco to merge with a company that had adequate funds to be used in those areas
of activity.
COHEN:
I can see where these fit into your concept, but I imagine you and Saul (Steinberg, Chairman of the Board) get
a number of questions—especially during the Chemical
Bank incident—about whether you are a conglomerate.
How do you answer them?

" . . . Accounting has
a very great influence on the
form of a merger.
But a merger must stand
on whether it's a good
business deal

the most

important consideration is for
the transaction to make
good business sense . . .
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SCHWARTZ:
The fact of the matter is we are not a conglomerate, if
I understand what a conglomerate is. For example, if you
were to bring us a candidate for acquisition that had
great return on invested capital, terrific gross profit
margins and margins on sales, good management, and
continuity and stability—but made hub-caps—Leasco
would not be interested. A conglomerate might be interested. We have a concept of what our company should
be; unless a new activity can bring additional strengths
and capabilities to our existing structure, we are not inclined to make acquisitions.
At one time we did consider the banking industry to be
a natural extension of the financial services end of our
business. Many banks are involved in the same business
as Leasco, such as computer services, equipment leasing and insurance.
Of course, any decision to enter the banking field must
take into careful consideration the proposed changes in
legislation affecting bank mergers and non-banking activities for bank holding companies. Until the legislative
picture is clarified, the banking industry is certainly not
on a front burner for an extension of our financial services activities.
COHEN:
Your acquisition of Pergamon Press (Ltd. of London)
has received considerable publicity in the newspapers,
too. It has been a most on-again-off-again acquisition,
and the outcome is still not settled.
SCHWARTZ:
It has been an interesting situation. In fact, it is a good
argument for why fundamentals should be followed in
an acquisition. As you know, we now own approximately
38% of the stock of Pergamon and we have had to delay
our bid for the acquisition of the remainder of the stock.
It became necessary for us to delay our tender offer for
the remainder of the outstanding stock pending a determination of the actual earnings for 1968 and 1969.
As you know, Pergamon is a dominant factor in the
publication of scientific books and journals. Its potential
could only be maximized by developing capabilities that
Leasco is expert in: computer and information techniques. Pergamon was uniquely positioned for the development of an international scientific data bank which
would have an internal tie-in to our plans for timesharing.
Accordingly, we had not only identified publishing as one
of our main areas of interest for development, we had

particularly focused upon Pergamon as a potential candidate for acquisition.
Saul Steinberg had met Robert Maxwell in London
and had some very preliminary, exploratory discussions
with him. In subsequent discussions we structured a deal
with Maxwell whereby Leasco would tender for all the
Pergamon outstanding shares; Maxwell agreed to support our bid and tender the stock that he owned and controlled (approximately 36%). As you remember, Pergamon is a public company listed on the London Stock
Exchange; they in turn own 70% of an American company called Pergamon Press, Inc. The balance of the
American company is owned by the public.
We have a specific and well-thought-out technique in
making acquisitions. Whenever possible, we attempt to
conduct a full investigation of the proposed company
prior to entering into a contract. Of course, sometimes
that is impossible when, for one reason or another, the
other company refuses to make available its books and
records prior to signing a contract. In those cases, we
always investigate after signing the contract and before
closing the transaction. Among other reasons, the purpose of the investigation is to verify the financial data
on which valuations are based.
Another protection that we seek is for the management of the other company to warrant the accuracy and
completeness of the financial data submitted to us during our negotiations.
Maxwell pointed out that the securing of warranties
and the right to prior investigation was not normal procedure in making tender offers for public companies in
England. However, we insisted on this protection and,
as it turned out, it was fortunate that we did so.
Tender offers for public companies in England are
quite a serious business, and it is not commonplace that
—once an offer has been announced—that it be revoked. Having announced our offer, and during our investigation, we did take a position of purchasing 38%
of the Pergamon stock in the open market. We had obtained the necessary clearance from the Bank of England to do so. We felt that the purchase of this stock was
not an inordinate risk and would give us an important
standing in the subsequent tender offer. Our judgment
was based upon what appeared to be accurate financial
information that was available. We had reviewed the
certified statements of Pergamon for the last eight years,
as well as examined the annual reports of both Pergamon Press, Ltd., and Pergamon Press, Inc. In addition,
Pergamon and its investment bankers had made a forecast of the 1969 earnings. Incidentally, earnings fore-

casts are considered to be standard procedure for any
company in preparation of a proxy statement because
they are regarded seriously. The company's investment
banker and auditors usually pass judgment on the accounting principles on which the forecast is based. You
may recall that in the latter part of 1968, Pergamon was
involved in a well-publicized but unsuccessful bid for
"News of the World" and, during that fight, it was generally regarded that all pertinent information regarding
Pergamon had been fully reported in the news media.
Accordingly, we felt that sufficient information was
available for us to rely on. This information, of course,
included the certified statements prepared by independent auditors.
However, serious doubts about the 1968 and 1969
earnings developed during the course of our examination. I might say, Phil, that my conversations with you
and Eddie Heft (Touche Ross partner) in outlining the
scope of our investigation, and the help your organization rendered during that time was extremely useful.
Two of your people should be particularly singled out:
Ian Irvine and Page Thibodeaux (partners in Europe),
who went through some very trying times in attempting to
secure the necessary information from a reticent Pergamon management. Just as an aside, it was necessary to
rearrange working habits during this transaction; our
negotiations generally started about 6 p.m. and hit a
stride at about three in the morning.
At any rate, it became apparent that the reported earnings for 1968 and the 1969 forecast were considerably
overstated. Consequently, our bid became over-valued.
This and other considerations caused us to announce the
revocation of our bid. At the current time, independent
auditors are conducting an investigation of the 1968 and
1969 accounts. At the completion of their report, Leasco
will prepare a bid for the outstanding stock, based on
their findings.

COHEN:
Bernie, you are aware the Accounting Principles
Board is considering potential amortization of goodwill,
and is putting restrictions on the concept of pooling.
How do you feel these will affect your acquisition program?

SCHWARTZ:
Well, I can't say flatly that the accounting has no influence on our decisions as to whether we do a merger.
It certainly has a very great influence on the form of a

merger. But in almost every case a merger or acquisition
must stand on whether it's a good business deal, and
accounting is only a tool for putting the deal together.
It would be a mistake, I think, for companies to make
deals because financially—or accounting-wise—they
get a short-term plus if the business deal is not a good
one to support it long range. The most important consideration is for the transaction to make good business
sense.

to the reporting of capital gains in the Reliance portfolio.
However, this problem does not arise because of the
pooling technique. It arises by virtue of an inconsistent
policy of handling stock-investment portfolios by various
financial organizations (insurance companies, banks,
etc.). On balance, pooling presents a much more precise
tool in presenting a fair picture of our combined operations.

I have very strong feelings about the accountants' attitude toward pooling. Although it is not a perfect tool,
in some instances it is better than purchase accounting.
My objection to the purchase concept is that it does not
give the prudent investor as much information as pooling about what the company will look like after the
merger. Further, to have the assets of the company inflated by an artificial number (goodwill), and then charge
future earnings by the amortization of that artificial
value, is not consistent with the economic realities.

COHEN:
Bernard, it is now five years since the start of your
acquisition program; we all know nobody is 100 percent
successful...
SCHWARTZ:
We have had more good scores than bad—a few we
were interested in got away, but almost every acquisition has met the criteria we outlined prior to the transaction. The additional capabilities we obtained in the
process, in most cases, would have been substantially
more costly to develop by ourselves and have enabled
us to grow into a major factor in the business activities
in which we are engaged. Leasco is truly an international
corporation with over 9,000 employees and over $1 billion in assets. So, on balance, I can say we have had a
successful pattern.

COHEN:
Take a specific case, say Reliance. How do you think
purchase or pooling would have affected that transaction?

SCHWARTZ:

In passing, Phil, I think it is appropriate to talk about
another phase in any acquisition program, and that is
the hard work after the negotiations are finished. Significant problems, depending upon the size of the acquisition, need to be solved in order to maximize the benefits
for the combined companies. These problems have to
do with organization, people relationships, questions of
integrating similar functions, eliminating duplications,
equalizing payroll incentive and fringe benefits, developing harmonious accounting—in short, reorganizing all
the functions of running a business. We have found that
the investment in people and effort in this phase is highly
rewarding. It demands much hand-holding, understanding and operating skills. At Leasco we have developed a
highly professional and well-motivated staff with expertise in the various areas of corporate activity. The
effort has paid off in terms of creating a total corporate
team with well-defined goals. In spite of the very active
acquisition and internal development programs that
Leasco has pursued, we have emerged a fully integrated
company.

As you know, we treated that acquisition as a pooling
and such treatment was consistent with the general
rules. We had acquired over 95% of the voting stock
of Reliance through an exchange of our equity securities
(voting preferred and warrants to purchase common
stock). The management continuity of each company
was shared and top executives of both companies
served in the active management of each other's offices
as part of the executive structure and boards of directors. Although the question of pooling versus purchase
accounting would have considerably affected the reporting results of the combined companies, the actual transaction was a consequence of business considerations
and was achieved through active negotiation prior to the
merger. These considerations included the taxability of
the transaction, the dividend rate, and the no-call feature
of the preferred stock and the term of the warrant. The
result of the transaction afforded us the use of pooling
so that the combined operations of the company would
be consistent with the past reporting of Leasco and Reliance. In addition, the combined reports would be consistent with those of many other financial organizations.

COHEN:

I realize that questions have been raised with respect

Yes, it appears that you have effectively integrated
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Reliance, for example—and from a shaky start. I remember that Bill Roberts (president of Reliance) was opposing you quite vigorously at the beginning.

is important for all of our managers to recognize that this
is a partnership effort, and Bill has responded to that
climate by being a full participant.

SCHWARTZ:

COHEN:

Mr. Roberts was a successful manager of a good company and was not interested in merging with anybody.
His reaction against Leasco was typical of any action he
would have taken against any attempted merger. However, after we met with Bill several times and demonstrated that we had sound concepts for the management
and direction of the joint operations of our companies,
I think he recognized the virtues of our association.

Many people have commented that Leasco has been
fortunate in being able to attract, and keep, good people.
Do you have a secret for this success?
SCHWARTZ:
Generally, there are three. We have been able to
create an environment of excitement. Leasco has been
a successful company. There are few companies that
have been built up as fast and as well as we, so we have
been a dynamic company and successful people want
to be with successful companies that are doing things.

Still Roberts negotiated hard for his stockholders. As
you remember in the Reliance situation, we changed the
package after we met with him to make our preferred
stock five years and no call, and we lowered our conversion price from 100 to 90. That was due to our negotiations.
Also, we agreed not to interfere with the operations in
the insurance end for five years. Roberts felt that he and
his associates could continue in the insurance end to do
what had to be dorfe, and we agreed wholeheartedly.

Second, all of our key people have equity positions in
the company, either with stock options, or through stock
purchases. More than 10% of the entire equity of the
company is represented by stock options. Our people
are not only interested from the point of view of environment, but they are interested from the point of view of
helping their own equity.

Today Bill Roberts is not only on our board of directors, but sits on our Management Review Committee. It

And third, we have an atmosphere in which all ideas
are welcome, regardless of the source. People here have

" . . . (Robert) Maxwell pointed out
the securing of warranties and
the right to prior investigation was not
normal procedure.. . However, we insisted
on the protection, and as it turned out,
it was fortunate we did so . . . "
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the opportunity to see translated into fruitful actions the
suggestions they make—and that is an important motivation for them. We have been fortunate also in receiving
valuable help from our professional people. You know
Touche Ross was our first accountant after we became
public, and your people have taken as great an interest
in us as our own people have. We get the kind of service
and the advice that we have been able to rely on. That
has helped us to be so successful.

to fill gaps. I was going to make a prediction but like all
predictions, I don't know if it will come true, but . . . I
don't think in the next 12 or 13 months we will make
acquisitions at the rate we have in the past. Our program
has been very successful up to now, and we filled in
many of the gaps.
COHEN:
What you're saying then is that these companies have
a good future profit potential and you want to develop
your acquired companies to the fullest.

COHEN:
Well, Bernie, we've talked about a number of major
acquisitions—and you've had more than 15. What are the
plans for the future, not as to specific companies, but
certainly as to prospects for further acquisitions?

SCHWARTZ:
Absolutely. Just to give you an example, we acquired
one company a year ago. At the time the merger was
consummated, the consideration was 27 times earnings.
Today, based on the consideration we gave them at that
time (but in relation to the earnings that they made this
year), we paid nine times earnings, and on next year's
anticipated earnings, it will probably be about four to
five times earnings. Now that's a successful acquisition
and I suppose we will always be interested in an acquisition that will perform similarly.

SCHWARTZ:
I think the company after only eight years has matured
in terms of identifying the direction it is going. We will
continue to investigate many areas and to identify those
that we should be involved in. But our most immediate
effort is the computer services business. In the near
future we will be interested in making acquisitions only
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